Energy policies for eco-friendly households in Luxembourg—a study based on the LuxHEI model by Poncin, Stéphane Louis Maxim
Energy policies for eco-friendly households in
Luxembourg—a study based on the LuxHEI model
Stéphane Poncin*†
March 1, 2019
Abstract
In the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the residential building sector is a major energy
consumer and greenhouse gases emitter that is considered key in achieving the country’s
climate goals. The purpose of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the most important
policy instruments in achieving savings in the final energy consumption and direct CO2
emissions of Luxembourgish households. Our study is based on the LuxHEI model, which
is an enhanced and upgraded version of the well-known French simulation model Res-IRF.
This variant has been adjusted to the particular problems of a small country with growing
economy and a quickly increasing population. The LuxHEI model goes beyond standard
energy-economy models by incorporating global warming as a decision-making factor. The
model outcomes reveal that total environmental and economic effectiveness increases if en-
ergy policy tools are applied concurrently. In 2060, and compared to the no-policy baseline
scenario, the most aspirational policy mix enables energy savings of 42% and an emission
mitigation of 60%. From our results we can draw the following policy implications: for a
significant improvement of the sector’s energy efficiency and sufficiency, (1) the implemen-
tation of a remediation duty for existing buildings and (2) the tightening of the performance
standards for new constructions, (3) combined with a national carbon tax, are crucial.
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21 Introduction
The residential building sector is estimated by the European Commission (2010) and the Inter-
governmental Panel on Climate Change (Pachauri et al., 2014) to hold a large and cost-effective
potential to save energy and reduce emissions. This potential has been known for a long time,
but ‘barriers’ to energy efficiency hinder its full exhaustion; a phenomenon that is often re-
ferred to as the energy efficiency gap or paradox (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Sorrell et al., 2000;
Thollander and Ottosson, 2008). In order to overcome such ‘barriers’, the application of en-
ergy policy tools that aim to increase energy efficiency and sufficiency is crucial (Gillingham
et al., 2018). Based on UNEP (2018), today’s efforts to mitigate the devastating consequences of
human-made climate change (Lindner et al., 2010) are largely insufficient to meet the vital goals
of the Paris Agreement1. Therefore, the further exhaustion of this key GHG-emitting sector’s
potential is now more important than ever.
The purpose of this paper is to assess the effectiveness of the most important policy instru-
ments in making Luxembourgish households more eco-friendly, that is achieving savings in the
final space heating energy consumption and direct CO2 emissions. More precisely, we analyse:
(1) the ranking of the policy instruments in terms of environmental and economic effectiveness
when they are applied individually; (2) the ways in which the instruments generate savings;
(3) how the instruments’ effectiveness is affected when they are applied concurrently; and (4)
whether the national energy and climate objectives are achievable in the country’s residential
building sector.
There exists a rich literature on the assessment of various energy policy instruments2. How-
ever, the one that specifically analyses the environmental and economic effectiveness of such
instruments, when they are applied (individually or in combination) to promote energy ef-
ficiency in the residential building sector, is relatively scarce. Moreover, to the best of our
knowledge, the latter analysis has not yet been performed for Luxembourg; the impacts of
policy tools can strongly differ from one country to another (Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007).
To fill this gap, we built on the work of Giraudet et al. (2011, 2012, 2015) and designed a sig-
nificantly enhanced Luxembourgish version LuxHEI (Luxembourgish Households’ Energy In-
dicators model) of the French hybrid energy-economy model Res-IRF (Residential module of
IMACLIM-R). Furthermore, Luxembourg has committed itself to meet ambitious energy and
climate targets, although in the next decades the country is expected to have good economic
growth and face the largest population growth rate (the population is projected to double until
2060) among all EU Member States (Haas and Peltier, 2017). For this reason, the findings of our
paper are useful to Luxembourg’s political decision-makers.
The LuxHEI model is basically designed as a bottom-up model: technologically powerful,
1The central goal of the Paris Agreement of 2015, who was ratified by most parties of the United Nations
Framework Convention on Climate Change (UNFCCC), is to keep the rise in global temperatures below 2 degrees
Celsius and even to aim for 1.5 degrees Celsius.
2Just to mention a few: Weitzman (1974); Pizer (2002); Lee and Yik (2004); Bovenberg et al. (2005); Boonekamp
(2006); Geller et al. (2006); Böhringer et al. (2008); Fankhauser et al. (2010); Boeters and Koornneef (2011); Huntington
and Smith (2011); Flues et al. (2014); Knobloch et al. (2018); Bye et al. (2018).
3but microeconomically rather limited (Hourcade et al., 2006). Since the model’s microeconomic
weaknesses are compensated by incorporating several ‘barriers’ to energy efficiency, it is con-
sidered a hybrid energy-economy model (Hourcade et al., 2006). More precisely, engineering
bottom-up models tend to follow the assumption of neoclassical economics: consumers be-
have efficiently when making energy conservation investments. As this hypothesis requires a
correct modelling of the costs and the decision-making behaviour, Giraudet et al. (2012) mod-
elled the impacts of ‘market barriers’, for example hidden-costs and consumer heterogeneity.
However in the real world decision-making does not always coincide with the neoclassical
standpoint, that is not all capital expenditures with positive net present value are realised. This
phenomenon is often referred to as the energy efficiency gap or paradox. Several attempts
to explain this gap appear in the literature (Jaffe and Stavins, 1994; Weber, 1997; Sorrell et al.,
2000; Rohdin and Thollander, 2006; Schleich and Gruber, 2008; Thollander and Ottosson, 2008;
Fleiter et al., 2011; Trianni and Cagno, 2012). For economists, suboptimal decisions result from
an imperfect market structure; in a perfect market consumers would act rationally (Gilling-
ham and Palmer, 2014). To include this ‘market failure’, the model takes into consideration
asymmetric information, learning-by-using and the principal-agent problem. Unlike neoclas-
sical approaches, behavioural ones assume that ‘behavioural failures’ lead consumers to make
less cost-efficient investments (Gillingham and Palmer, 2014). To account for such suboptimal
decision-making, the model relies on restricted consumer awareness. Further, to reduce over-
estimations of the sector’s energy saving potential, a rebound effect is encoded in the model.
The most important innovative feature of the LuxHEI model is probably the fact that it en-
codes climate change as a decision-making influence factor. More precisely, we assume that the
significant consequences of global warming imply, firstly, that the percentage of the existing
building stock that is renovated annually increases over time (from 1% to 3%), and, secondly,
that the market becomes more heterogeneous. The model thus goes beyond standard models
which are often based on financial considerations only. Indeed, models that do not take suffi-
cient account of the effects of climate change have reduced informative value and misinform
policy-makers. The LuxHEI model also changes some methods or adapts them to the available
national data, and to the peculiarities of a small country with growing economy and quickly
growing population. We encoded for example the special national situation in all calibration
procedures, parameterisations and evaluated policy instruments. Moreover, we included more
sustainable energy efficiency classes (Zero Energy Buildings (ZEB) and Positive Energy Build-
ings (PEB)), energy carriers (pellets and solar), and heating systems (heat pumps). As to the
carriers considered in the LuxHEI model, some of them can be authorised only in higher energy
efficiency classes and some carrier switches are prohibited. We incorporate the discrepancy that
exists between the Luxembourgish households’ conventional and the effective energy needs for
heating through an adjustment factor, which we determined empirically — for each energy ef-
ficiency class and each carrier. Further, when an owner retrofitted his dwelling, the tenant or
potential buyer profits from reduced heating energy costs. The LuxHEI model encodes the cor-
responding green value, that is the percentage of the energy costs savings that the owner can
expect recovering through the monthly rent and/or the sales price. In addition, we encoded
4a dynamic evolution of the new constructions’ building types and changed the inclusion of
discount-rates.
The article is structured as follows. Section 2 describes how the final energy consumption
of Luxembourgish households is encoded in the LuxHEI model. In the ensuing section we
outline the modelling of the existing building stock transformations. Section 4 completes the
explanation of the model by elucidating the dynamics of the new building stock. The following
section depicts the policy instruments that are analysed, as well as the way in which they are
modelled. In Section 6, we present and discuss the results of our simulations. In a final section,
we draw conclusions and make policy recommendations.
2 Description of the LuxHEI model (I) — Energy Consumption
2.1 Final energy consumption
Our objective is to study between 2014 and 2060 the impact of various policy tools on the space
heating final energy consumption Efin of Luxembourgish households. Therefore we compute
the final energy consumption for residential space heating in the year t + 1 from the situation
in the year3 t.
The final energy consumption Efin(t) in the year t (in kWh) is given by
Efin(t) = S(t)
Econ(t)
S(t)
Efin(t)
Econ(t)
, (1)
where S(t) denotes the total residential building stock (in m2), Econ(t)/S(t) is the theoreti-
cally/conventionally needed final energy (in kWh /m2), and Efin(t)/Econ(t) is the quotient of
the effective and the conventional needs (dimensionless).
We rewrite now the right-hand side (RHS) of (1). Therefore we attribute an energy efficiency
class to each dwelling. For existing dwellings we use classes i ∈ I = {I, . . . , B,A} , where A is
the most efficient and I the least efficient of the 9 classes in I. For new buildings we consider
only 4 classes j ∈ J = {B,A,ZEB,PEB} . We introduce 32 additional categories. Firstly we
distinguish between owner-occupied individual houses and flats and tenant-occupied individ-
ual houses and flats, which defines the 4 categories D ∈ D = {O-H, O-F, T-H, T-F} . We allow
for the 8 energy carriers heating oil, gas, electricity, pellets, oil combined with a solar thermal
system, gas with solar, electricity with solar and pellets with solar, which gives the 8 categories
e ∈ E = {F, G, E, P, F+s, G+s, E+s, P+s} . Altogether we obtain for each k ∈ I ∪J a 4×8 matrix
of categories D, e. Each class k is defined by an overall primary energy demand that we can
transform for each type e of carrier into a conventional final energy ρk,e needed for heating per
square meter (and year). When we denote the residential building stock in k,D, e by Sk,D,e(t) and
the factor Efin,k,e(t)/Econ,k,e(t) in k, e by Fk,e(t), the final space heating energy (1) is computed
by
3Starting from the situation on December 31 of our initial year t = 2013, we compute the situation on December
31 of the year t+ 1 = 2014, from this, the situation in 2015, and so on, up to 2060.
5Efin(t) =
∑
k ∈ I ∪ J
D ∈ D
e ∈ E
Sk,D,e(t) ρk,e Fk,e(t) , (2)
where the dimensionless factor Fk,e(t) is the adjustment factor.
2.2 Conventional unit space heating energies
The Luxembourgish ‘Energy Performance Certificate’ (EPC) of a dwelling contains inter alia the
energy efficiency class k (which depends on the insulation, the heating system characteristics
and the carrier). Each class k is characterized by its ‘overall primary energy demand’ Qpri(k).
This demand is the sum of the overall primary energy demand for heating Qpri,h(k), hot water
Qpri,hw(k) and auxiliary usages Qpri,a(k), thus
Qpri,h(k) = κkQpri(k) ,
where the percentage κk is determined empirically. Note that Qpri,h(k) is the conventional
unit primary energy needed for heating in the class k. However, the model actually uses the
conventional unit final energy needed for heating ρk,e that characterizes a category k, e,
ρk,e = ε
−1
e Qpri,h(k) , (3)
where εe depends exclusively on the carrier e and is taken from the Memorial A-No221 of the
Grand Duchy of Luxembourg. The conventional unit (per square meter and per year) energies
ρZEB,e and ρPEB,e for a ‘Zero Energy Building’ and a ‘Positive Energy Building’ with carrier e
cannot be computed by (3) since the EPC does not yet include the energy efficiency classes ZEB
and PEB. We set
ρZEB,E+s = 0 and ρPEB,E+s = −27 .
Indeed e = E + s is the unique significant carrier in ZEBs and PEBs. The value −27 is based on
the average energy production of existing PEBs.
The conventional energies ρk,e (k ∈ {ZEB,PEB} and e = E + s) are the sums of the build-
ings’ theoretical energy consumption ρconk,e and the opposite ρ
pro
k,e < 0 of their theoretical energy
production. We highlight that for k ∈ {ZEB,PEB}, D ∈ D and for e = E + s, the terms
Sk,D,e(t) ρk,e Fk,e(t) in equation (2) must be interpreted as Sk,D,e(t)
(
ρconk,e Fk,e(t) + ρ
pro
k,e
)
. In
this case we must thus rewrite equation (2) as
Efin(t) =
∑
k ∈ I ∪ J
D ∈ D
e ∈ E
Sk,D,e(t)
(
ρconk,e Fk,e(t) + ρ
pro
k,e
)
. (4)
62.3 Adjustment factor
The model computes the space heating final energy consumption by (2) and not by the approx-
imation
Efin(t) =
∑
k,D,e
Sk,D,e(t) ρk,e .
It does take into account the discrepancy that exists between the effective and the conven-
tional needs. This difference can easily be understood. The national EPC (which allowed us
to compute the conventional unit energies ρk,e) was designed to compare the energy efficiency
of buildings and the calculations in the energy passports are of course based on standard us-
age parameters. Heterogeneous user behaviour can however entail significant deviations in
the energy consumption of structurally identical buildings (Schuler et al., 2000; Braun, 2010;
Cayla et al., 2011; Wei et al., 2014; Hörner et al., 2016). Standardised values are also used in
the EPC to describe technical systems, construction materials or climate conditions. These val-
ues in the passports’ computation base still increase the discrepancy between the effective and
conventional needs.
There exist different ways to model the adjustment factor. In Lichtmeß (2013) the author
determines the Luxembourgish factor empirically using a function of the type
Fk,e = a+
b
1 +
ρk,e
c
.
We model this factor as a logistic function
Fk,e(t) = a+
b
1 + exp(c ρk,ePe(t)− d) (a, b, c, d constant) (5)
of ρk,ePe(t). The references for the price Pe(t) of the carrier e in the year t (expressed in €
per kWh ) are the energy price projections in Capros et al. (2016) and Birol et al. (2015). The
modelling of the adjustment factor by such a logistic function was suggested in Cayre et al.
(2011) and used in Giraudet et al. (2012).
Equation (5) captures the impact of energy efficiency measures and energy price varia-
tions on energy sufficiency (known as prebound or rebound effect (Sunikka-Blank and Galvin,
2012)). More precisely, in dwellings with a low energy performance (high ρk,e), households
tend to consume less energy than the conventional energy ρk,e (prebound effect, Fk,e(t) < 1).
The exact opposite can be observed in buildings with a high energy performance (low ρk,e):
the households’ measured energy consumption is close to or even exceeds ρk,e (rebound effect,
Fk,e(t) > 1). The user behaviour is similar when Pe(t) passes from high values to low ones. The
best modelling choice for Fk,e(t) is therefore a decreasing logistic function (c > 0) in ρk,ePe(t).
The formula used by Lichtmeß (2013) (by Giraudet et al. (2012)) to compute F in Luxem-
bourg (in France) gives for ρ = 0, that is the ‘lowest’ possible ρ, an adjustment factor F = 110%
(F = 120%). For ρ = 500 (for ρP = 100), that is the ‘highest’ possible ρ (ρP ), one obtains
7F = 45% (F = 40%). The increased value 45% is natural when compared with the Luxembour-
gish disposable income. Projections estimate that the Luxembourgish households’ disposable
income will have almost doubled in 2060 (Haas and Peltier, 2017). We adopt therefore the
values 120% and 50% and set
lim
ρk,ePe(t)→−∞
Fk,e(t) = 150% = a+ b and lim
ρk,ePe(t)→+∞
Fk,e(t) = 50% = a .
The first limit means that even if ρP becomes negative the average population behaves respon-
sibly. We will also observe that the limits lead to the desired values 50% and 120% for ρP = 100
and ρP = 0. Although we use prices Pe(t) that vary over time, we keep the values of a, b, c and
d in (5) constant. Based on the data of the Ministry of the Economy of Luxembourg (2017), a lin-
ear regression over all categories k, e (with very good R-squared, standard error and p-value)
gives c = 0.175 and d = 0.875. The adjustment factor is finally computed by
Fk,e(t) = 0.5 +
1
1 + exp(0.175 ρk,ePe(t)− 0.875)
(we get 50% and 120% for ρP = 100 and ρP = 0) 4. We wish to highlight that the adjustment
factor depends on
ρk,e Pe(t) =
(
ρconk,e + ρ
pro
k,e
)
Pe(t) ,
and not on ρconk,e Pe(t) . In other words we assume that the households adjust their behaviour
to the net amount of money that they earn and not to the money that they spend for heating.
Moreover using the latter sum of money would mean that the factor Fk,e(t) is the same in the
classes A, ZEB and PEB, since these classes have the same insulation and therefore the same
theoretical energy consumption. Our hypothesis implies that the adjustment factor increases
when one passes from A to ZEB and from there to PEB.
3 Description of the LuxHEI model (II) — Dynamics of the existing
building stock
Note that we study separately the building stock that existed at the end of 2013 (EBS) and the
building stock that was newly constructed as of 2014 (NBS).
For each i ∈ I, D ∈ D and ei ∈ E (subscript i added to avoid possible subsequent ambigu-
ity), we must compute the existing building stock Si,D,ei(τ) in τ = t+ 1 from the known entries
Sι,∆,ει(t) of a 9× 4× 8 matrix. We use the formula
Si,D,ei(τ) = (1− γi,D,ei(t))Si,D,ei(t)−
∑
f>i
TRANSi,f ; D,ei(τ) +
∑
ϕ<i
TRANSϕ,i ; D,ei(τ) . (6)
4We conduct at present a separate study on the dependence of the adjustment factor on socio-economical vari-
ables as income or occupancy status.
8Here γi,D,ei(t) is the demolition rate of the stock Si,D,ei(t). The second and third terms are
the renovations/transitions in τ from class i to a higher efficiency class f and from a lower class
ϕ to the class i respectively. For example to get the existing stock in class i = F in 2017, we start
from the existing stock in class F in 2016 that was not destroyed. From this stock we deduct
the buildings in the energy class F that were upgraded to any higher energy class in 2017 and
we add the buildings that were upgraded to the energy class F in 2017. The model also takes
into account the 5% of Si,D,ei(0) that will not be destroyed and will not be renovated until 2060:
to simplify we ignore this percentage in our description.
The next formula (which will be improved later on) explains the computation of the second
term of equation (6) (the third term is calculated analogously):
TRANSi,f ; D,ei(τ) = (1− γi,D,ei(t))Si,D,ei(t) Xi,D,ei(τ) PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) . (7)
This means that in order to find the transitions/retrofits from the initial class i to any higher
final class f , the model first computes the fraction Xi,D,ei(τ) of the nondestroyed stock in i
that is retrofitted in τ (proportion of retrofits in class i), then the fraction PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) of the
latter that is retrofitted to f in τ (proportion of retrofits to class f ). We explain in 3.5 how the
demolition rate γi,D,ei(t) is computed from the average demolition rate γ in the whole stock
S(t) (the rate γ is considered as time-independent).
3.1 Distributions of retrofits
The distributionPRi,f ; D,ei(τ) in the year τ of decided retrofits in a class i over all higher classes
f is calculated by
PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) =
LCCi,f,D,ei(τ)
−ν∑
h>i
LCCi,h,D,ei(τ)
−ν . (8)
Indeed when a retrofit from i was decided, the number of retrofits from i to f is roughly pro-
portional to the inverse of the life cycle costs LCCi,f,D,ei(τ) of such a renovation. Hence, the
percentage PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) is obtained by equation (8) with ν = 1. However, the percentages
observed in the initial year do not correspond well with the computed ones. The accordance
becomes better for higher values of ν and the best one is obtained for ν = 7. This technique was
introduced in Jaccard and Dennis (2006) to model consumer heterogeneity; which corresponds
to a ‘market barrier’. Values of ν close to 1 reflect preference heterogeneity: the choice of dif-
ferent investment options is relatively even. In contrast higher values of ν such as ν = 7 reflect
a more homogeneous investment behaviour: the retrofitting option with the lowest life cycle
costs LCCi,h,D,ei(τ) is selected by most consumers. If ν increases the price elasticity of demand
(for us the elasticity of the number of retrofits) increases (in absolute value). If the life cycle
costs P of a retrofit increase by 100% the number Q of retrofits decreases by (2−ν − 1)× 100%.
9The price elasticity at the initial price and initial number is then
∆Q/Q
∆P/P
=
(2−ν − 1)× 100%
100%
.
3.1.1 Climate change
Up to here the model is based on the price-demand relationship and ignores possible shocks
that could suspend this rule. More precisely, in consideration of current climate trends (Lind-
ner et al., 2010), it is likely that over the next decades, the effects of climate change become more
and more perceptible for society. Moreover, within the modelling period, not only will the Lux-
embourgish population’s educational level keep raising if present trends continue (Schofer and
Meyer, 2005), but the country is also projected to face economic growth and increasing dispos-
able household incomes (Haas and Peltier, 2017). It is known that environmental awareness is
an increasing function of the experience of global warming impacts (Reynolds et al., 2010) and
the educational level (Palmer et al., 1999; Aminrad et al., 2011). It can further be observed that
the inhabitants of a territory with economic growth, an above-average income per capita, and
bad environmental quality, have great willingness to invest in environmental improvement
measures (Huang et al., 2006). This tendency is strengthened by more self-serving reasons
(Huang et al., 2006), that is an improvement of the insulation of a dwelling can also be decided
to decrease suffering from heat rather than to protect the climate. With regard to all these de-
velopments and observations, we assume that Luxembourgish households will progressively
accept to spend more money for a retrofitting to a low energy class and a nonfossil carrier,
even when this decision is financially not really interesting. The market will thus become more
heterogenous: the parameter ν will decrease over time.
We model ν as a decreasing logistic function of time with asymptotic values 7.5 and 1:
ν(t) = 1 +
6.5
1 + exp(ct− d) (c > 0) .
Although climate summit meetings target zero emissions around 2050 and a limitation of global
warming to less than 2 degrees Celsius by the end of this century (Falkner, 2016; Schleussner
et al., 2016), recent developments resulted in forecasts that the effects of climate change will be
seriously perceptible around 2030 (Pachauri et al., 2014). Therefore we set the inflection point
of the sigmoid curve at the year 2040 (t = 27). This means that 27c = d+ ln 0.5. This condition
and the information ν(0) = 7 give d = 2.48 and c = 0.066:
ν(t) = 1 +
6.5
1 + exp(0.066 t− 2.48) . (9)
In 2060 the value of ν is (a bit higher than) 3.25, which means that approximately 10% of the
population maintain their renovation choice even when the costs double.
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3.1.2 Life cycle costs
The life cycle costs LCCi,f,D,ei(τ) are the sum of the investment/retrofitting costs INVCi,f (τ),
the energy operating costs ENERCi,f,D,ei(τ) and the intangible costs ICi,f (τ):
LCCi,f,D,ei(τ) = INVCi,f (τ) + ENERCi,f,D,ei(τ) + ICi,f (τ) . (10)
The model assumes that first the decision to renovate from i to f is made and that only then the
decision to switch from the initial carrier ei to a final one is taken. Therefore the energy operating
costsENERCi,f,D,ei(τ) are based on the initial carrier ei. We will explain below their dependence
on i ∈ I and on D ∈ D.
3.1.3 Investment costs
The evolution of the investment costs INVCi,f (τ) is modelled by equation
INVCi,f (τ) = INVCi,f (0)
(
α+ (1− α)(1− l)log2
Cf (τ)
Cf (0)
)
. (11)
A large spectrum of measures can be taken to retrofit a building from an energy class i to
a higher class f . The initial retrofitting costs INVCi,f (0) (in € per m2) are therefore average
costs, which include costs ranging from small improvements of the envelope and the heating
system to significant ones. The matrix of initial investment costs (see below) respects similar
rules to those used in Giraudet et al. (2012) and was determined after concertation with experts
from renovation companies.
Table 1 – Initial retrofitting costs INVCi,f (0) (in € /m2)
H G F E D C B A
I 100 250 475 775 1150 1600 2125 2725
H 190 415 715 1090 1540 2065 2665
G 280 580 955 1405 1930 2530
F 370 745 1195 1720 2320
E 460 910 1435 2035
D 550 1075 1675
C 640 1240
B 730
The idea of equation (11) is that the retrofitting costs INVCi,f (0) in the year 0 have decreased
in the year τ due to the experience Cf (τ) accumulated in τ through realised retrofits to the
class f . The term INVCi,f (0)α is the percentage α (we choose α = 20% (Giraudet et al., 2012))
of the initial retrofitting costs that cannot be decreased by experience. The reduction of the
remaining costs INVCi,f (0)(1 − α) is modelled through the multiplication by the exponential
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function (1− l)log2
Cf (τ)
Cf (0) . The constant l is a market failure called the learning-by-doing rate (we
choose l = 10% (Weiss et al., 2010; Giraudet et al., 2012)). The accumulated experience Cf (τ) is
calculated from Cf (t) by the formulas
Cf (τ) = Cf (t) +
∑
i<f
∑
D,ei
TRANSi,f ; D,ei(t) (12)
and
Cf (0) = 15× 1%× Sf (0) . (13)
The experience Cf (0) in 2013 was accumulated through retrofits between 1998 and 2012. For
Cf (τ) = 2
nCf (0) we find that
(1− l)log2
Cf (τ)
Cf (0) = (1− l)n :
for each doubling of the experience the price INVCi,f (0)(1− α) is multiplied by 1− l, that is it
decreases by l = 10%.
3.1.4 Energy operating costs
Step 1: Approximate energy costs
We used already the energy price projections Pe(t) for the carriers e (in € per kWh) (Capros
et al., 2016; Birol et al., 2015)). The energy operating costs (in € per m2) over the average
lifetime N of a retrofit (in Luxembourg N = 35 years (Ministry of the Economy of Luxembourg
and Lichtmeß, 2014)) are the sums
ENERCf,ei(τ) =
N∑
t=1
Pei(τ + t) ρf,ei . (14)
The terms of these sums are costsCt that are paid over theN years t of the lifetime. The decision
maker on the retrofit may use money from an interest-bearing investment with interest rate rD.
He bases his decision therefore on the net present value of the periodic cash flows Ct . The
model considers moreover the prices Pei(τ + t) as constant over lifetime and replaces them by
Pei(τ). The reason behind this modelling choice is a market failure. We assume that similarly
to the findings in Simon (1955), the uncertainty about the energy price evolution leads people
to drop a part of the information at disposal when making decisions about energy conservation
investments. The energy operating costs are therefore calculated by
ENERCf,D,ei(τ) = Pei(τ) ρf,ei
N∑
t=1
(1 + rD)
−t . (15)
This equation allows one to account for the Landlord-Tenant dilemma, an important ‘market
failure’ to energy renovation in the residential sector of the European Union (Ástmarsson et al.,
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2013). This principal/agent issue occurs if tenants and landlords have split incentives: tenants
wish to reduce their energy bill through energy efficiency measures but owners are reticent to
come up for the costs (as they have no direct return on the investment) (Gillingham et al., 2012;
Charlier, 2015). Hence, non-occupying homeowners require for investments into energy effi-
ciency higher profitability than occupying homeowners. In order to model the lower (higher)
number of renovations in the categories T-H and T-F (O-H and O-F) we assign different interest
rates to these four decision situations D:
rT-H = 0.10, rT-F = 0.07, rO-H = 0.30 and rO-F = 0.25 .
The lower (higher) rates for tenant-occupied (owner-occupied) dwellings produce higher
(lower) net present values or energy operating costs. The model yields therefore lower (higher)
numbers of renovations in the categories T-H and T-F (O-H and O-F): it models the reality
correctly. Moreover the weighted mean of the four percentages is 0.24, which agrees with the
observation of Hausman (1979) and Train (1985) that the range of this mean is 0.20–0.25.
Step 2: Energy costs with green value
In Luxembourg owners sell their dwellings after an average period T of 9 years. When an
owner retrofits (we assume that he renovates right after he bought the habitation) the potential
tenant and the future buyer have the advantage of reduced energy costs. The ‘green value’
G is the percentage of the energy cost savings that the owner recovers through monthly rents
and/or an increased sales price5. For occupying owners D we replace the approximate energy
costs (15) by the energy costs
ENERCi,f,D,ei(τ) = Pei(τ) ρf,ei
T∑
t=1
(1+rD)
−t−
(
Pei(τ) (ρi,ei − ρf,ei)
N∑
t=T+1
(1 + rD)
−t
)
G , (16)
where the last term is the percentage of the energy cost savings of the new owner which D
recovers when selling his dwelling. If D is a nonoccupying owner he can furthermore recover
the same percentage through the rents that the tenant pays during the first T years:
ENERCi,f,D,ei(τ) =
Pei(τ) (ρf,ei − (ρi,ei − ρf,ei)G)
T∑
t=1
(1 + rD)
−t −
(
Pei(τ) (ρi,ei − ρf,ei)
N∑
t=T+1
(1 + rD′)
−t
)
G , (17)
where rD′ is the owner interest rate that corresponds to the tenant interest rate rD (for ex-
ample ifD = T-H, thenD′ = O-H since the buyer tries to reduce the increase of the sales price).
5We base on the findings of Högberg (2013) and set G equal to 33%.
13
3.1.5 Intangible costs
When the calculation of the proportions PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) is based only on the costs INVCi,f (τ)
and ENERCi,f,D,ei(τ), the computed proportions do not coincide in the year 0 with the ob-
served proportions. In order to counter this gap, Giraudet et al. (2012) used intangible costs
ICi,f (τ)
6. These intangible costs are split into hidden intangible costs HICi,f (τ) (market bar-
rier) and intangible costs IICi,f (τ) due to imperfect information. Hidden costs can hardly be
changed and they are therefore calculated as a constant percentage β of the initial intangible
costs:
HICi,f (τ) = ICi,f (0)β .
With growing accumulated experience Cf (τ) imperfect information gets smaller (Jaffe and
Stavins, 1994; Jaffe et al., 2004) the costs IICi,f (τ) decrease and tend finally to disappear com-
pletely. We model the evolution of these costs by
IICi,f (τ) = ICi,f (0)
1
1 + c exp
(
d
Cf (τ)
Cf (0)
)
(c, d > 0), where the decreasing logistic function of the relative accumulated experience
Cf (τ)/Cf (0) takes the value 1− β for τ = 0. Equation
ICi,f (τ) = HICi,f (τ) + IICi,f (τ) = ICi,f (0)
β + 1
1 + c exp
(
d
Cf (τ)
Cf (0)
)
 (18)
is therefore consistent in the year 0.
Moreover when the initial accumulated experience doubles, the initial value 1 − β is mul-
tiplied by a factor 1 − µ (we take the percentages β = 20% and µ = 25% from Giraudet et al.
(2012)). The percentage µ can be compared with the learning-by-doing rate l. Indeed when the
initial accumulated experience doubles, the initial value 1−α (see above) is multiplied by 1− l.
In other words, the percentage µ corresponds to the information acceleration rate related to the
asymmetric information which causes the market failure. The learning-by-doing rate has an
analogous interpretation. We obtain that way the system of equations
1
1 + c exp d
= 1− β and 1
1 + c exp 2d
= (1− β)(1− µ) .
This system can be transformed in a system of linear equations in ln c and d. We find
c =
(1− µ)β2
(µ+ (1− µ)β)(1− β) > 0 and d = ln
(
µ
(1− µ)β + 1
)
> 0 . (19)
The constant c determines the proportion 1/(1 + c) that corresponds to Cf (τ) = 0; the constant
6The idea of using intangible costs to ameliorate the modelling of life cycle costs stems from the energy-economy
model CIMS (Jaccard and Dennis, 2006; Rivers and Jaccard, 2005).
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d is responsible for the steepness of the sigmoid curve. Equation (19) shows that if the informa-
tion acceleration rate µ increases, the values of 1/(1 + c) and d increase, just the way it should
be.
The accumulated experience is calculated as before by equation (12) and (13).
We can use equation (18) once the initial intangible costs are known. Because they are
intangible the initial costs ICi,f (0) cannot be observed. In order to calculate these costs we
consider for any i < B the system
PRi,f (0) = Ff (INVCi,h>i(0),ENERCh>i(0),ICi,h>i(0)) (i < f ≤ A) (20)
which is obtained from equation (8) and (10).
We derive the proportions PRi,f (0) from the analysis of 402 retrofitting operations under-
taken in the Luxembourgish residential sector. This sample does not allow us to observe the
proportionsPRi,f ; D,ei(0). The initial energy costs must therefore also be independent ofD and
ei. The sample is split into two building types, individual houses and flats. In order to elimi-
nateD from the energy costsENERCh,D,ei(0) we use a weighted mean r of the average discount
rates of the building types. To eliminate the carrier we calculate the proportions PRei(0) from
the available data and compute the energy costs in each efficiency class as weighted mean:
ENERCh(0) =
∑
ei
PRei(0)Pei(0)ρh,ei
N∑
t=1
(1 + r)−t .
The sum of the proportions on the left hand side of (20) is equal to 1, just as the sum of
the functions on the right hand side is (cf. (8)). The system (20) reduces therefore to the same
system but with f > i and f < A. The new system is a system of 8 − i equations (cf. possible
values of f ) and of 9 − i unknown intangible costs (cf. possible values of h). That is why
an additional equation must be added to the new system. The percentage λ of the average
LCCi,h>i(0) which consists of the average ICi,h>i(0) is defined by equation∑
h>i
PRi,h(0)ICi,h(0) = λ
∑
h>i
PRi,h(0)LCCi,h(0)
in the same unknown intangible costs ICi,h>i(0). This is the needed additional equation. It con-
tains the parameter λ which should of course have a low value. For any i < B we use the fsolve
command of MATLAB to find the lowest value of λ for which the total system (new system and
additional equation) has a solution. This finishes the calibration of the initial intangible costs.
3.2 Further description of the transformations of the existing building stock
We improve now equation (7). Indeed we must still incorporate the carrier switch that we
mentioned in the paragraph 3.1.2, that is we must compute the transitions from i to f and ei to
ef . Therefore we calculate the total proportions PRTi,f ; ei,ef ;D (8×8×8×8×4 matrix; some of
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its elements vanish since dwellings are renovated to better energy classes). Such a proportion
is the product of the proportion PRi,f ; D,ei of retrofits from i to f (8× 8× 4× 8 matrix) and of
the conditional proportion PRSei,ef ;D |i,f of switches from ei to ef (8× 8× 4 matrix).
We thus compute the transitions
TRANSi,f ; ei,ef ;D(τ) =
(1− γi,D,ei(t))Si,D,ei(t) Xi,D,ei(τ) PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) PRSei,ef ;D |i,f (τ) (21)
(f > i) and the transitions
TRANSϕ,i ; eϕ,ei ; D(τ) =
(1− γϕ,D,eϕ(t))Sϕ,D,eϕ(t) Xϕ,D,eϕ(τ) PRϕ,i ; D,eϕ(τ) PRSeϕ,ei ; D |ϕ,i(τ) (22)
(ϕ < i). In order to obtain the number of transitions (or the corresponding number of square
meters) that is needed in (6), we sum the transitions (21) over all f > i and all ef , and we sum
the transitions (22) over all ϕ < i and all eϕ. The first sum is equal to∑
f>i
TRANSi,f ; D,ei(τ) =
(1− γi,D,ei(t))Si,D,ei(t) Xi,D,ei(τ)
∑
f>i
PRi,f ; D,ei(τ)
∑
ef
PRSei,ef ;D |i,f (τ) =
(1− γi,D,ei(t))Si,D,ei(t) Xi,D,ei(τ) . (23)
The second sum is equal to∑
ϕ<i
TRANSϕ,i ; D,ei(τ) =∑
ϕ<i
∑
eϕ
(1− γϕ,D,eϕ(t))Sϕ,D,eϕ(t) Xϕ,D,eϕ(τ) PRϕ,i ; D,eϕ(τ) PRSeϕ,ei ; D |ϕ,i(τ) (24)
and really depends on the proportions PR and PRS.
3.3 Distributions of carrier switches
3.3.1 Homogeneous market
We calculate the (conditional) proportions PRSei,ef ; D |i,f (τ) of switches from ei to ef analo-
gously to the proportions PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) of retrofits from i to f :
PRSei,ef ; D |i,f (τ) =
LCCS
−ν(τ)
f,D,ei,ef
(τ)∑
eh
LCCS
−ν(τ)
f,D,ei,eh
(τ)
. (25)
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Here ν(τ) is the dynamic homogeneity parameter given by (9) and
LCCSf,D,ei,ef (τ) = SWICei,ef +Pef (τ) ρf,ef
M∑
t=1
(1 + rD)
−t . (26)
The life cycle costs (26) of a switch from ei to ef are similar to the life cycle costs (10) of a
retrofit from i to f . The switching costs7 SWICei,ef of (26) include for example costs arising
from oil tank removal, drilling for geothermal probes or laying a gas pipe, corresponding ser-
vices provided by electricians or masons etc, while the analogous investment costs INVCi,f (τ)
in (10) include the heater and heater installation costs. The second term of (26) can be com-
pared with the term ENERCi,f,D,ei of (10), except that in the present situation the final carrier
is known and that we can compute therefore the energy costs using this carrier (which is more
natural). Whereas the lifetime N of a retrofit is 35 years, the lifetime M of a carrier switch is 20
years (Ministry of the Economy of Luxembourg and Lichtmeß, 2014). We do not use a green
value in (26) because we switch the carrier in a fixed efficiency class. In contrast with (10),
equation (26) does not contain intangible costs since in Luxembourg the observations needed
for the calibration of the initial intangible costs are unavailable. Finally the switching costs are
considered as constant, no learning effect is included, also due to infeasibility.
Table 2 – Switching costs SWICei,ef (in € /m
2)
INVC INVC/m2Switch Costs/m2
OIL 22800 #DIV/0! 61
GAS 19000 #DIV/0! 64
PELLETS 33000 #DIV/0! 82
WP 32000 #DIV/0! 50
SOLAR 16500 #DIV/0! 27
122
Oil 0 64 50 82 27 91 77 109
Gas 61 0 50 82 88 27 77 109
Electricity 183 186 0 172 204 210 213 199 231
Pellets 61 64 50 0 0 88 91 77 27 27
Oil+Solar 0 64 50 82
Gas+Solar 61 0 50 82
Electricity+Solar 61 64 0 0 82
Pellets+Solar 61 64 50 0 0
Electricity 
+ Solar          
(if k>=B)
Pellets     
+ Solar 
(if k<A)
Pellets    
+ Solar           
(if k=A)
Einbau Wärmeverteilung (+Radiatoren)
Oil Gas
Electricity     
(if k<B)
Electricity    
(if k>=B)
Pellets 
(if k=A)
Oil +    
Solar
Gas + 
Solar
Pellets 
(if k<A)
Electricity 
+ Solar         
(if k<B)
The final carriers ‘pellets’ (P), ‘pellets combined with solar thermal system’ (P + s) and
‘electricity’ (E) can be chosen only in higher energy efficiency classes. Firstly, the final energy
depends only on the heating system and the quality of the envelope of the dwelling. The final
energyQfin of almost all dwellings is lower than 643 kWh (perm2 and per year). When a person
who renovates chooses the final carrier P or P + s, the primary energy Qpri = 0.07Qfin is lower
than 45. This however does mean that the dwelling has the energy efficiency class A. In other
words, a person who renovates to the final class f = C or f = B cannot choose the carriers
7These costs were determined after concertation with experts from renovation companies.
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P and P + s, otherwise it misses almost always its goal to renovate to f : our model allows the
choice of the carriers P and P + s only if the chosen final class is f = A. Secondly, given the
bad overall efficiency of electric heaters and the resulting environmental disadvantages, the
Luxembourgish government wants to push back these heating systems and promotes the use
of heat pumps instead. Hence in our model, if ef = E or ef = E + s the heating system used is
a heat pump. However for technical reasons heat pumps are only adapted for space heating in
the energy classes B, A, ZEB and PEB: carrier switches to ef ∈ {E,E + s} are only permitted if
f > C.
In contrast with what we just said, the heating system of an initial carrier ei ∈ {E,E + s} is
an electric heater. As these systems consist mostly of direct-heating electric radiators and not
of central heating systems (as do all other carriers in the model), switching from such an ei to
any other carrier is very expensive. Finally, because carrier switches are related to retrofits to
higher energy classes, households who used already ‘solar’ do usually not switch to a carrier
without ‘solar’: switches from ei ∈ {F+s,G+s,E+s,P+s} to ef ∈ {F,G,E,P} are not allowed.
3.3.2 Heterogeneous marked
We calculate the percentages PRSei,ef ; D |i,A(τ) using the homogeneous market behaviour de-
fined by the homogeneity parameter ν(τ). The numbers of houses using E, E + s, P or P + s
are then rather low in 2060. The reason of this insufficiency of the model are the values of ν(τ)
which range from 7 to 3.25 (when the life cycle costs double the percentage of switching deci-
sions deceases from 100% to a percentage between approximately 1% and 10%). The values of
ν(τ) can of course decrease in specific subpopulations. For example switches in the class A to
one of the carriers E, E +s, P or P +s reflect a very good environmental consciousness, which
decreases the effect of costs on the switching decision. In order to remedy the mentioned insuf-
ficiency of the model we decrease ν(τ) in the calculation of the proportions PRSei,ef ; D |i,f (τ) .
We justified in the paragraph 3.3.1 that if f ≤ C only the carriers F, F +s, G and G +s are
possible. If f = B the decider can choose ef ∈ {F,F +s,G,G +s,E,E +s}, whereas for f = A
all eight carriers are possible final carriers. In the first case we choose in the calculation of the
proportions PRS the parameter ν(τ) given by (9). In the final class A [B] we choose ν(τ) − 1
[ν(τ)− 0.5] and further reduce this parameter in a way which depends on the chosen carrier.
The following is an alternative modelling approach which produces good (in particular not
at all excessive) results.
In order to specify a coherent way to further reduce ν we record numerically, on a scale
from 0 to 5, the environmental awareness α of the deciders who switch in A (B) to the carrier
ef = F (F +s,G,G +s,E,E +s,P or P +s)(
ef = F (F +s,G,G +s,E or E +s)
)
.
We set
α = 0.0 (0.4, 0.4, 0.8, 3.2, 3.6, 4.0 and 4.4)
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(
α = 0.0 (0.2, 0.2, 0.4, 1.6 and 1.8)
)
.
In the calculation of the proportions PRSei,ef ; D |i,A(τ) we replace ν(τ) by
νA(α, τ) = ν(τ)− 1− pi α .
The coefficient pi is determined by the request that for the maximal awareness 5 the heterogene-
ity parameter is νA(5, 47) = 1 in the year 47 (that is in 2060). We obtain
νA(α, τ) = ν(τ)− 1− 0.25α .
For B we get
νB(α, τ) = ν(τ)− 0.5− 0.35α .
Finally we use the formula (25) to find the proportions PRS in the classes f ≤ C. In f = A
and f = B we use the same formula but replace ν(τ) by νA(α, τ) and νB(α, τ) and choose the
value α that corresponds in A and B to the final carriers ef and eh.
3.4 Fraction of retrofitted buildings
3.4.1 Without climate change
The proportion Xi,D,ei(τ) of retrofits of dwellings of class i is correlated to the profitability
of the corresponding investment. The net present value NPVi,D,ei(τ) of such a retrofit is the
difference between the lifetime energy costs in the class i (when no retrofit is made) and the
weighted average lifetime costs of a retrofit from i to any higher class f :
NPVi,D,ei(τ) = ENERCi,D,ei(τ)−
∑
f>i
PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) LCCi,f,D,ei(τ) . (27)
All the quantities needed to calculate the net present value have already been computed.
The precise relation between NPVi,D,ei(τ) and Xi,D,ei(τ) is modelled by a logistic function
with asymptotic values 0% and 100%:
Xi,D,ei(τ) =
1
1 + a exp(−b NPVi,D,ei(τ))
(28)
(a, b > 0) 8: if the net present value begins to increase it is not yet really attractive and the
proportion of retrofits increases only slowly; if the ‘profit’ of a retrofit becomes more and more
attractive the proportion increases quicker.
Equation ∑
i,D,ei
Si,D,ei(0)
1 + a exp(−b NPVi,D,ei(1))
= 0.01S(0)
8This modelling choice is micro-founded (Giraudet et al., 2018).
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asks that the surface which is retrofitted in the first year be 1% of the surface of the exist-
ing building stock in the initial year. The constants a and b are the positive solutions of this
equation for which the percentage 1/(1 + a) of retrofits for zero-profitability is minimal. This
calibration problem is an optimisation problem under constraint and because of that it is solved
numerically using Lagrange multipliers.
3.4.2 With climate change
The percentage of the existing stock S(t) which is renovated in the next year will increase over
time for the reasons set out in the paragraph 3.1.1. This percentage p(τ) is modelled as an
increasing logistic function with asymptotic values 0.85% (in the year 0 the value of p was 1%
in Luxembourg) and 3.15% (newer versions of Giraudet et al. (2012) use the value p = 3%
constantly, from the initial to the final year). By the same procedure as the one for ν(τ) we
obtain
p(τ) = 0.01
(
0.85 +
2.30
1 + exp(−0.124 τ + 2.66)
)
.
In this modelling alternative a and b in (28) depend on τ : a = aτ and b = bτ . Their calculation
uses the time-dependent constraint
∑
i,D,ei
Si,D,ei(t)
1 + aτ exp(−bτ NPVi,D,ei(τ))
= (p(τ)− 0.01)S(t) +
∑
i,D,ei
Si,D,ei(t)
1 + a exp(−b NPVi,D,ei(τ))
.
In this formula the sum at the left hand side is the total surface which is renovated in the year τ
after consideration of the economic and the climatic issues encoded in the LuxHEI model. The
percentage p(τ) in the right hand side increases from the current 1% to 3% due to (essentially)
climatic reasons. Since in the term (p(τ) − 0.01)S(t) we subtract the approximate total surface
0.01S(t) that is renovated in τ for economic reasons, this term represents the total surface
renovated in τ for climatic reasons. Adding the last term of the right hand side means replacing
the approximate (0.01S(t)) by the true (the one which is calculated in paragraph 3.4.1) total
surface renovated in τ for economic reasons.
3.5 Demolition rates
The demolition rate γi,D,ei(t) in the stock Si,D,ei(t) remains to be calculated. We regard the
demolition rate γ in the whole stock S(t) as time-independent: γ is equal to the demolition rate
0.35% which was observed in S(0). The calculation of γi,D,ei(t) is based on the suggestion of
Sartori et al. (2009) to first demolish the low energy classes. The total destruction in t in the
category D, e is
TotD,e(t) = 0.0035× SD,e(t) = 0.0035×
∑
i
Si,D,e(t) .
We model the suggestion to begin demolishing this surface in the worst energy class: if in the
category D, e the percentage SI,D,e(t)SI,D,e(0) of class I dwellings in the year 0 that do still exist in the
20
year t, is still high (already low) we demolish much (we do not demolish much) of the total
destruction TotD,e(t) in the class I ; the demolition in I is taken to be
DI,D,e(t) = TotD,e(t)× SI,D,e(t)
SI,D,e(0)
9 . (29)
The remainder of the total destruction is demolished in the next class:
DH,D,e(t) = TotD,e(t)−DI,D,e(t) . (30)
If in some year the class I has been completely destroyed we destroy first in H , then in G etc.
Equation (29) can be written
DI,D,e(t) =
TotD,e(t)
SI,D,e(0)
SI,D,e(t) = γI,D,e(t)SI,D,e(t) . (31)
We write (30) similarly:
DH,D,e(t) =
TotD,e(t)−DI,D,e(t)
SH,D,e(t)
SH,D,e(t) = γH,D,e(t)SH,D,e(t) . (32)
Equation (31) and (32) allow one to calculate γI,D,e(t) and γH,D,e(t).
4 Description of the LuxHEI model (III) — Dynamics of the new
building stock
In the section 3 we looked at the building stock which existed in 2013 (EBS), its transformations
and demolitions: we calculated the evolution over time of the surface Si,D,ei of the EBS in all
9× 4× 8 categories i,D, ei.
Hereinafter we study the building stock growth or new building stock (NBS). We will cal-
culate for all 4 × 4 × 8 categories j,D, ej the temporal development of the surface Sj,D,ej (or
the number Hj,D,ej ) of new ‘houses’ constructed in 2014 or later (in the case of new buildings
j ∈ {B,A, ZEB, PEB}).
The total housing needs
H =
L
LPH
(33)
are the quotient of the ‘population’ and the ‘average population per house’ (if L = 500, 000
and LPH = 4 the total housing needs are 125, 000). The evolution over time of L is obtained
exogenously using the findings of Haas and Peltier (2017). The data of Statec (2011) suggest
that the number LPH of people per house decreases over time. In the model, the decrease of
LPH is bounded by a minimal number which is set equal to 2, and is calculated endogenously.
9As we cannot demolish more in the class I than available, the real destruction in I is the minimum of DI,D,e(t)
and SI,D,e(t).
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We denote the number of new constructions in 2014, 2015, etc, up to τ (τ = t+ 1, t ≥ 0) by
H(τ). The difference (∆H)(τ) = H(τ)−H(t) is the number of new constructions in the year τ .
This number is also the difference
(∆H)(τ) = H(τ)−
 1
SPH
∑
i,D,ei
Si,D,ei(τ) +H(t)
 (34)
between the housing needs H(τ) in τ and the sum of the number of dwellings from 2013 and
earlier that do still exist in τ and the number of new dwellings constructed in 2014, 2015, up to
t. The existing stock
∑
i,D,ei
Si,D,ei(τ) is expressed in m
2 and must therefore be divided by the
average surface SPH of a ‘house’ which existed in 2013, because equation (34) is expressed in
(number of) houses.
The surface (∆S)(τ) which corresponds to the new constructions (∆H)(τ) depends on the
surface per house:
(∆S)(τ) = SPH(Y (τ))(∆H)(τ) . (35)
The surface SPH(Y (τ)) is an increasing function of the disposable income per capita. The value
of Y (τ) for the years τ up to 2060 comes from the projections of Haas and Peltier (2017).
We model SPH (SPH(Y (τ))) incorporating a maximal surface per house and the expecta-
tion that the annual increase of SPH shrinks as the surface gets closer to this limit. The mod-
elling of the evolution over time of LPH is very similar. Base on the data of Statec (2017) it can
be observed that the surface Σ = SPH increases by 20% if the income doubles 10: (∆Σ)/Σ = 20%
if (∆Y )/Y = 100%. More generally:
∆Σ
Σ
=
∆Y
Y
× 20% ,
that is
Στ = Σt
(
1 +
∆Y
Y
× 20%
)
. (36)
The repeated application of (36) produces an increasingly higher surface although Σ is in fact
bounded by a limit or maximal surface Σmax. The quotient Σmax−ΣtΣmax−Σ0 allows us to model the
idea that Σ increases by lower percentages than 20% when it comes closer to Σmax. Indeed, it is
enough to replace equation (36) by equation
SPH(Y (τ)) = Στ = Σt
(
1 +
∆Y
Y
× Σmax − Σt
Σmax − Σ0 × 20%
)
.
In the same way as for the EBS S(τ), we distribute the NBS S(τ) amongst the categories j,D, ej .
The surface of new constructions in the category j, ej is
(∆S)j,ej (τ) = PRNj,ej (τ)(∆S)(τ) .
10The percentage 20% is only valid in the categories O-H and T-H; for O-F and T-F it is only 1%.
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The proportion PRNj,ej (τ) of new constructions in j, ej is calculated exactly as the propor-
tion in (8) and the one in (25):
PRNj,ej (τ) =
LCCN
−ν(τ)
j,ej
(τ)∑
k,ek
LCCN
−ν(τ)
k,ek
(τ)
and 11,12
LCCNj,ej (τ) = INVCNj,ej (τ) + ENERCNj,ej (τ) + ICNj,ej (τ) .
Table 3 – Initial construction costs INVCNj,ej (0) (in €/m
2)
Total 166 SwitchC SystemC
22800 137 61 76 ef <A 180
19000 114 64 51 ef=A 211
32000 193 50 143
33000 199 82 117
39300 237 88 124
35520 214 91 99
48500 292 77 191
49500 298 109 165
12500 75 27 48
B A ZEB PEB 2600 2389
Oil 2527 2716
Gas 2504 2692
Electricity 2582 2776
Pellets 2588 2782
Oil+Solar 2626 2823
Gas+Solar 2603 2799
Electricity+Solar 2682 2883 3084 3285
Pellets+Solar 2688 2889
Unlike the proportions (8) and (25), the share PRNj,ej (τ) does not dependent on the category
D. Indeed the dependence onD comes in (8) and (25) from the different discount rates used for
the different categoriesD, and these discount rates are not needed in the case of new dwellings.
We get the searched surface (∆S)j,D,ej (τ) by the formula
(∆S)j,D,ej (τ) = PRD(τ)PRNj,ej (τ)(∆S)(τ) ,
where PRD(τ) is the proportion of D-dwellings (owner-occupied houses when D = O-H ) in
the new constructions in the year τ . As D = P ∩ T (P ∈ {O,T}, T ∈ {H,F}), we have
PRD(τ) = PRT (τ) PRP|T (τ) .
The percentagePRP|T (τ) was observed in the year τ = 1 and we use that value. The two shares
PRT (τ) are known once we found the percentage PRF(τ) of flats in the new constructions in τ .
11The initial construction costs INVCNj,ej (0) were again determined after concertation with experts from reno-
vation companies and do only contain direct building costs, that is no land costs are included.
12The carrier ej is E+s for j ∈ {ZEB,PEB}. Indeed aZEB (PEB) is a ‘house’ with a neutral (positive) annual
energy balance: a ZEB (PEB) produces as much (more) energy as the household consumes over a year. This is
achieved by perfect insulation and an efficient heating system. We assume households living in such buildings to
have high environmental awareness; they desire sustainable heating and want to maximise the energy production
from renewable energies. The model therefore only allows solar thermal heating combined with a heat pump which
works mainly with electricity from the in-house photovoltaic system.
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The data of Statec (2017) suggests that PRF(τ) is an increasing logistic function of the relative
growth
G(τ) =
H(τ)−H(1960)
H(1960)
of the total building stock with respect to 1960:
PRF(τ) = a+
b
1 + exp(−cG(τ) + d) (a, b, c, d > 0) .
We have
lim
G→+∞
PRF = a+ b = 1
and set
lim
G→−∞
PRF = a = 0 .
This choice is justified as the linear regression that gives c (c = 0.54) and d (d = 0.42) is of good
quality and the law
PRF(τ) =
1
1 + exp(−0.54G(τ) + 0.42)
leads to a good approximation of the observed value PRF(1960).
5 Description of the energy policy tools
The building sector being accountable for about half of the EU’s energy needs and greenhouse
gas (GHG) emissions (Lechtenböhmer and Schüring, 2011), the sector is crucial to meet large
energy and climate objectives (for example the EU’s 20-20-20 strategy or the Paris Agreement);
and so is the residential building sector (Itard, 2008). Also in the Luxembourgish energy policy
the building sector is of particular importance: since the 1990s the government promotes en-
ergy conservation in the building stock through the application of various policy instruments.
More precisely, energy policy tools of direct nature (regulatory instruments) as well as of indi-
rect nature (communication or financial instruments) were implemented to address the barriers
that hinder the exploitation of the sector’s large energy conservation potential (often referred
to as the energy efficiency gap or paradox). In the LuxHEI model we evaluate the effects of cur-
rently applied and possible future financial and regulatory instruments. A detailed synopsis of
the instruments and their modelling is provided in this section.
5.1 Applied instruments — initial and extended form
5.1.1 Capital grants
Since 201313 the Luxembourgish state offers PRIMe-House capital grants to promote household
investments in insulation measures on existing dwellings, green building and sustainable heat-
13Instruments that were already applied in 2013 are considered in the calibrations of the model.
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ing systems.
The subsidy (S1) granted for insulation measures in an existing dwelling increases with the
quantity of insulation material used (including windows) and with its quality. Since informa-
tion about material properties is not captured by the model, we use available data to compute
that for a retrofit from i to f , 15% of the average capital expenditures for insulation measures
are covered by this policy tool (up to 2026). This modelling choice reflects reality as the level of
subsidies increases, as it should, with the quality of the final energy class f , that is the number
and/or grade of the undertaken actions.
Between 2013 and 2016, state aids were also granted for all new energy class B and A
constructions (for example the maximal grant for a new single-family house of class A was
24,000 € in 2014). With the introduction of the Luxembourgish environmental certification sys-
tem LENOZ in 2016, the regulations of this policy changed. The new scheme determines a
building’s sustainability no longer exclusively by its energy class, but also through its geo-
graphical location and factors of economic and social nature. To benefit from the grant, new
constructions must now obtain a certain amount of points in the LENOZ-evaluation. Since
such specifications are not tangible for the model, we build on the assertions of consultants
from Myenergy14 and assume that between the beginning of 2017 and the end of 2020, 35% of
new energy class A dwellings, 50% of new ZEB, and 65% of new PEB remain eligible for this
second type of PRIMe-House grant (S2).
Until the end of 2024, the Luxembourgish state also offers grants for solar thermal plants,
pellet heating systems and heat pumps (varying between 2,500 € and 8,000 €). An additional
subsidy (of 1,000 € ) is accorded whenever the two latter systems are combined with a solar
thermal plant. As the overall costs of a heating system replacement are split into system and
installation costs (included in the investment costs INVCi,f (τ)) and ancillary costs induced by
the carrier swap (included in the switching costs SWICei,ef ), this last type of grant (S3) is split
(S3 = Sa3 + Sb3, Sa3 and Sb3 are fixed percentages of S3):
INVCi,f (τ)
′ = INVCi,f (τ)− (S1(τ) + Sa3 (τ)) ,
SWICei,ef (τ)
′ = SWICei,ef −Sb3(τ) ,
INVCNj,ej (τ)
′ = INVCNj,ej (τ)− (S2(τ) + S3(τ)) .
Based on the findings of ADEME (2013) we take into account that probably not all eligible
households actually use the capital grants; mainly because of imperfect information. Due to the
substantial efforts of the Luxembourgish government to promote the PRIMe-House grants we
expect the information level for this tool to be fairly high, and to further increase over the pro-
jection period. We thus assume that on average 75% of retrofits and 90% of new constructions
apply the instrument.
In addition an extended version of the policy is modelled. More precisely, at the end of
the instruments’ initial application period, the model prolongs the grants for 15 additional
14Myenergy is the main national structure to promote the transition to sustainable energy.
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years and considers their application as mandatory; as in Giraudet et al. (2011, 2012) all eligible
households apply the instrument.
5.1.2 Subsidised loans
Since the launch of the national climate bank in 2017, which is based on a convention between
the state and 6 private banks, households are eligible for a retrofitting credit at REDUCED IN-
TEREST OR EVEN ZERO-INTEREST RATE. The interest-free loan was introduced to support the
low-income households15. that wish to retrofit their dwelling. Recipients of this aid can take
out a loan of up to 50,000 € , repayable (without interests) within 15 years, and further get a
capital grant of 10% of the loan. A climate credit at REDUCED INTEREST RATE is accessible on the
contrary to all households. This type of loan is limited to a maximum of 100,000 € , repayable
within 15 years, but the state grants a 1.5% subsidy on the interest rate of the bank.
To encode this policy tool we refer again to ADEME (2013) and consider that not all house-
holds borrow money to pay a retrofit. Similarly to the situation observed in France we assume
the proportion P of retrofitting households taking out a loan to be 30%, whether or not the pol-
icy tool is applied. For this proportion P the investment costs INVCi,f (τ) are increased by the
accrued interests under an averaged fixed interest rate16. Only if the policy tool is applied by
the government, we subtract from the increased investment costs INVCi,f (τ) of the proportion
P , the saved interests. Further, the instrument’s effectiveness is increased by limiting its dura-
tion of application (Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007): based on the duration of capital grants,
the subsidised loans’ duration is limited to 2026.
Comparably with the extended version of the PRIMe-House grants, we encode a com-
plementary scenario where the instrument’s period of application is prolonged until 2041
(+15 years) and the 1.5% subsidy is increased to 2.0%.
5.1.3 Energy tax
Since the European Commission implemented the EU Energy Taxation Directive (ETD) (Mat-
teoli, 2003) in 2003, minimum tax rates are imposed on energy products in the Member States.
Within this framework, the Luxembourgish government taxes the use of electricity and fuels
like oil, gas and coal (if they are not used to produce electricity). In Luxembourg, the tax rates
depend on the energy source (the carrier), their sector of application and the volume of the an-
nual consumption. We calculated that carriers used for space heating in the residential sector
are taxed between 1.5 €/t CO2 and 5 €/t CO2. In this first form of the policy tool we consider
the energy tax as time-independent and encode the instrument by adding the amount of the
tax (converted into € per kWh) to the energy price Pe(t) of the corresponding carrier e.
An enhanced energy tax is also included in our model: following the objective of the min-
istry to raise the taxes on energy products (Ministry of the Economy of Luxembourg et al.,
15According to Myenergy only a very small sub-population is eligible for this credit
16Mean of the fixed rates on mortgage loans charged by Luxembourgish banks between 2009 and 2017.
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2017), we increase the initial level of taxation by 100% every 10 years. The first increase is
implemented in 2025, the last in 2055.
5.1.4 Energy performance requirements for new buildings
Luxembourg introduced its first regulation on the thermal insulation of new residential build-
ings in November 1995: the heating demand of such constructions was legally determined.
With a first amendment of this regulation in November 2007, the thermal insulation standard
was intensified and requirements on the new constructions’ energy efficiency were added, that
is the maximum overall primary energy demand of new buildings is now prescribed by law as
well. Since the LuxHEI model uses essentially the energy efficiency classes k, we solely con-
sider the energy efficiency regulations in the modelling of this policy tool. We start from the
requirement that new constructions have at least the overall primary energy class D as of 1
January 2008, and increase this standard to class B (A) as from 1 July 2012 (1 January 2015).
With the Directive 2010/31/UE, adopted by the European Parliament on 19 May 2010, Mem-
ber States are bound to construct at least ‘nearly Zero-Energy Buildings’ (nZEB) as of 2020.
For Luxembourg this standard is mandatory since 1 January 2017. It corresponds to the high-
est overall primary energy class and the highest thermal insulation class in the EPC (energy
performance certificate, cf. above).
Once again, an extra scenario in which building codes are further tightened is included: as
of 1 January 2030 (2045) the standard ZEB (PEB) becomes mandatory for new constructions.
5.2 Possible future instruments
5.2.1 Remediation duty for existing buildings
As most Member States, Luxembourg does not specify minimum energy efficiency standards
for existing residential buildings (BBSR, 2016). The only obligation with regard to existing
dwellings is to respect minimum material standards when retrofitting. However in Luxem-
bourg’s neighbouring countries (Germany and France), stricter requirements on the existing
building stock do exist. In Germany, partial renovation is mandatory after the acquisition of
an existing building: if a dwelling was bought or inherited after 1 February 2002 the new own-
ers must either insulate the roof or the top floor ceiling. Since 2009, Germany also obligates
households to insulate heating pipes and to switch heating systems that were installed before
1978. As regards France, the National Assembly adopted on 26 May 2015 a bill which stipulates
that every dwelling must be retrofitted until 2025 if its overall primary energy consumption is
above 330 kWh /m2 (and year); this corresponds to a house of energy efficiency class G in the
Luxembourgish EPC. The bill also dictates that as of 2030, all dwellings must be retrofitted
before they can be listed for rent or sale. Although this bill was rejected by the constitutional
council (for a matter of form) it might be reconsidered in the near future.
Considering the energy saving and CO2 mitigation potential of the existing building stock
(Petersdorff et al., 2006; Tommerup and Svendsen, 2006) and the rules deployed in two of Lux-
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embourg’s three bordering countries, we included a remediation duty in the LuxHEI model:
as of 2022 (considered as the closest possible year for implementation), all residential buildings
that are listed for rent or sale must be retrofitted to an overall primary energy class above H .
To ensure effectiveness of this tool, the regulation is tightened by one energy class every five
years: buildings whose inhabitants switch must at least reach class F as of 2027, E as of 2032,
and D (C) as of 2037 (2042).
Without remediation duty, a fraction ζ of the proportion Xi,D,ei(τ) of retrofits of dwellings
of class i is induced by an inhabitant switch. When the instrument is applied, all inhabitant
switches are followed by a retrofit. To avoid double counting when the remediation duty is in
force, the fraction ζXi,D,ei(τ) must be subtracted from Xi,D,ei(τ) and equation (7) of the model
has to be changed to:
TRANSi,f ; D,ei(τ) = (1− γi,D,ei(t))Si,D,ei(t)
(
Zi,D,ei(τ) + (Xi,D,ei(τ) (1− ζ))
)
PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) ,
for all i < imin and all f ≥ imin . The percentage Zi,D,ei(τ)17 is the proportion of owner-occupied
or rented dwellings that change occupancy in the year τ and the class imin is the required lowest
efficiency class. More precisely, if i < imin and f < imin , we set PRi,f ; D,ei(τ) = 0 , and if
i ≥ imin , then f > imin and in this case we do not change the original formula.
5.2.2 Carbon tax
In 2005, the world’s first and largest international emissions trading system, the European
Union Emissions Trading System (EU ETS), was implemented to reduce greenhouse gas (GHG)
emissions in the EU. This system however covers only about 45% of the EU’s GHG emissions
since it does not cap the volume of gases emitted by the agriculture, residential and trans-
portation sectors. For these three sectors, binding national targets are fixed through the Effort
Sharing Decision (ESD).
To meet these targets in a cost-effective way, a carbon tax is often recommended by envi-
ronmental economists (Pearce, 1991; Gerlagh and Van der Zwaan, 2006; Ghalwash, 2007). As
several attempts to introduce an EU-wide carbon tax failed, we consider in our model a national
carbon tax that applies a uniform price to emissions from all sources and sectors (Bruvoll and
Larsen, 2004; Lin and Li, 2011). For this purpose we set the initial level of the tax equal to the
price of the EU ETS allowances (Weisbach, 2012), and increase the level over time to enhance
the reduction of CO2 emissions progressively (Peck and Teisberg, 1992). More precisely, the tax
is based on the predicted annual price increase of EU ETS certificates (Capros et al., 2016). The
carbon tax (in the residential sector) will thus increase from 15 €/tCO2 in the starting year 2020
of the policy tool to 33 €/tCO2 in 2030 and 89 €/tCO2 in 2050. In the second half of the century,
carbon emissions are projected to decrease (Chakravorty et al., 1997; OECD et al.) and the level
of the tax is estimated to decline (Vollebergh, 2014). We therefore assume that the carbon tax
comes down to 80 €/tCO2 (72 €/tCO2) in 2055 (2060).
17The data of Eurostat (2017) shows that Zi,D,ei(τ) is 1.3% (6%) for owner-occupied (rented) dwellings.
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The modelling of the carbon tax is similar to the encoding of the energy tax: the price of the
tax (in € per kWh) is added to the energy price Pe(t) of the corresponding carrier e.
6 Results and discussion
We now evaluate the policy tools we introduced in the previous section, proceeding similarly
as in Amstalden et al. (2007); Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz (2007); McCormick and Neij (2009);
Giraudet et al. (2011); Knobloch et al. (2018). For this purpose, different model scenarios are
generated: firstly the model is run without any instrument (this baseline scenario serves as a
benchmark for the following evaluation), secondly each instrument is put in force individually
(the original and extended forms of the existing policy tools are examined), thirdly various
bundles of instruments are studied (the bundle of all existing initial tools, the bundle of all
existing extended tools and the bundle of all existing and possible future tools (in this latter
combination all the existing tools are in extended form, except the energy tax)). After each
run the scenario is assessed with regard to its environmental and economic effectiveness, and
its potential to help achieving the Luxembourgish energy and emission targets is determined. To
contribute to the EU’s 20-20-20 strategy, Luxembourg must decrease by 20% its final energy
consumption (in comparison with the 2007 level) as well as its CO2 emissions from sectors
outside the EU ETS (in comparison with the 2005 levels). In the period 2021-2030, emission
cuts of even 40% must be achieved (relative to the 2005 levels). Even though the national
targets are not limited to a single sector, the second part of our assessment is interesting since
the building sector offers one of the greatest potentials to decrease energy consumption and
CO2 emissions (Schulz, M., and Mavroyiannis, A. D.; TIR Consulting Group LLC and Grand
Duchy of Luxembourg Working Group, 2016), and this at comparatively low costs (Levine
et al., 2007; Schimschar et al., 2011).
6.1 Baseline projection
The model projects for 2060 (Table 4 and Figure 3) a total final energy consumption of 4,122GWh
(-9% compared to 2014) and total CO2 emissions of 734,600 tCO2 (-20% compared to 2014). The
major growth of the residential building stock (Figure 1) is due to the projected increase of the
Luxembourgish population: based on the 3% GDP growth scenario of Haas and Peltier (2017)
and the baseline population projections of Eurostat, we can assert that Luxembourg will face
the largest population growth rate (approximately 98% between 2014 and 2060) among all EU
Member States. At the end of the model’s projection period, the (cumulated) new building
stock (NBS) therefore corresponds to 66% of the total building stock. On this basis, savings in
energy consumption and CO2 emissions can only be achieved through changes in energy ef-
ficiency or energy sufficiency. Energy efficiency gains are mainly realised by a transformation
of the existing building stock (EBS), that is demolitions and retrofits, and the construction of a
highly efficient NBS. More precisely, in 2060, the final energy consumption per square meter
has fallen by 61% (in comparison with 2014) (Table 4), 69% of the total dwellings have at least
the energy class B (compared to 7% in 2014), and 32% of the households make use of solar
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thermal energy to support their heating system (Table 6, Figures 5 and 6). Such large energy
efficiency increases are however followed by a significant rebound effect: by the end of the
projection period the adjustment factor raised by 38% (Table 5 and Figure 2). This is due to the
fact that all along the modelling period the continuously increasing share of dwellings with a
low ρk,e compensates the natural raise of the energy price Pe(t), thus generating a shrinking of
the adjustment factor’s independent variable ρk,ePe(t) and hence a higher overall factor F (t).
Concerning the country’s energy objectives, none of them can be achieved in the residential
building sector (Table 8): the 2020 levels of final energy consumption (CO2 emissions) are 29%
(7%) higher than the 2007 levels (2005 levels), and the 2030 emissions are projected to decrease
only by 4% instead of 40% (compared to 2005).
Note that ignoring the effects of climate change, the green value, and the dynamic evolution
of the new constructions’ building type, changes the outcomes of the baseline scenario for the
worse. More precisely, compared to the baseline projection that contains all new features (see
above), we end up with a total final energy consumption that is 8% higher (4,478 GWh) and
total CO2 emissions that are increased by 10% (805,600 tCO2). This is inter alia due to the fact
that at the end of the projection period, the total number of retrofits has decreased by 50%
[compared to the projection with all new features], only 0.2% (0.0%) of the total building stock
correspond to ZEB (PEB) [0.8% (0.5%) in the projection with all features], and just 27% make
use of solar thermal energy to support their heating system [32%].
6.2 Evaluation of the individual energy policy tools
In the following evaluation, the effects of the 10 single-instrument scenarios (see above) are
compared to the baseline scenario. The ranking 1–10 means ‘most effective–least effective’; the
description of the results starts at ‘rank 10’ and ends with ‘rank 1’.
6.2.1 Places 10 to 7: Subsidy schemes
No significant variations (about 1% at most) from the baseline are observed in the initial and
extended forms of the subsidised loan and capital grant scenarios.
From an ecological and economic viewpoint, the initial subsidised loan scenario is the least
effective. Compared to the baseline projection virtually no reduction effects can be observed:
additional energy and emission savings of 0.01% (Table 4, Figures 3 and 4) are realised, for a
benefit to cost ratio18 of 101 € per kWh saved (Table 7).
In the enhanced version of the subsidised loan scenario, whilst energy and emission sav-
ings increase slightly (-0.02%; Table 4, Figures 3 and 4), cost-effectiveness deteriorates (+26%;
Table 8).
A bit better but still insignificant results are achieved in the scenario with the initial form of
the capital grants: energy savings (-0.17%) and emission reductions (-0.47%) can be observed in
18The difference of the 2060 final energy consumption of the baseline scenario and the 2060 final energy con-
sumption of the corresponding policy tool scenario, divided by the financial incentives accumulated during the
policy’s application period.
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2060 (Table 4), for a benefit to cost ratio of 74 € per kWh saved (Table 7). Although the instru-
ment induces gains in energy efficiency (-0.21% of conventional energy consumption in 2060), a
decrease of the adjustment factor is observed (-0.05% in 2060) (Table 5 and Figure 2). This small
prebound effect is mainly due to the somewhat greater use of electricity, an energy carrier with
a comparatively high energy price. Compared to the baseline scenario, a small decrease in
accumulated retrofits is also observed at the end of the projection period (-0.05%; Table 5 and
Figure 7). This is due to the fact that capital grants boost the number of retrofits during their
application period so that less lucrative retrofitting options remain after that period.
Although the environmental effectiveness of capital grants more than doubles in the en-
hanced scenario (Table 4), its cost-effectiveness changes for the worse (+40%; Table 7).
6.2.2 Places 6 and 5: Energy taxes
Next ranks the initial [extended] form of the energy tax scenario: state revenues of 14 [8] €
per kWh saved (Table 7) come along with a decreased total final energy consumption (-0.34%
[-1.61%]) and decreased total CO2 emissions (-0.37% [-1.77%]) (Table 4, Figures 3 and 4) in 2060.
On the contrary to the initial and extended forms of the capital grant scenario, the savings come
rather from a better energy sufficiency (adjustment factor in 2060: -0.17% [-0.81%]) than from
gains in energy efficiency (conventional energy consumption in 2060: -0.02% [-0.08%]) (Table
5). More precisely, the prebound effect induced by the increased price Pe(t) of most carriers e
[largely] offsets the rebound effect caused by the slightly more efficient building stock. At the
end of the projection, no substantial deviation from the baseline can be observed in the total
number of retrofitted dwellings and in the performance of the total final building stock (Tables
5 and 6).
6.2.3 Places 4 and 3: Remediation duty and carbon tax
Significant savings are reached in the remediation duty and carbon tax scenarios. Compared
to the baseline, the remediation duty [carbon tax] reduces the final energy consumption by
4.58% [5.38%] and the carbon dioxide emissions by 5.28% [6.04%] (Table 4, Figures 3 and 4).
Although both possible future instruments result in comparable savings, the way in which
they are achieved is different.
Among all 10 single-instrument scenarios, the remediation duty generates naturally the
largest increase in retrofitted buildings (+39% in 2060; Table 5 and Figure 7). This induces
not only the second-highest increase in energy efficiency (conventional energy consumption in
2060: -8.01%), but also the second-highest rebound effect (adjustment factor in 2060: +1.17%)
(Table 5). We observe in Figure 7 that each tightening of the remediation duty causes a prompt
raise in annual retrofits. However, after the last tightening of the regulation, the prompt raise
in retrofits is followed by a steady drop. Similarly to the phenomenon observed in the cap-
ital grant scenarios, annual demolitions and retrofits yield a shrinking of the building stock
Si,D,ei(t) that is affected by the remediation duty. Relative to the baseline, a visibly higher
share of solar energy is achieved by the policy tool, and while it decreases the share of energy
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efficiency classes below E an increase in the share of the classes E, D and C is observed (Table
6, Figures 5 and 6). From a governmental perspective the scenario generates no direct expenses
or revenues (Table 7).
In contrast to this, but comparable to the effects already observed in the energy tax sce-
narios, the carbon tax generates state revenues of 10 € per kWh saved (Table 7) and realises
its savings (conventional energy consumption in 2060: -0.35%) less through performance im-
provements but rather through a more conscious heating behaviour; implying the strongest
decrease of the adjustment factor (-3.00% in 2060) (Table 5). Further, no significant variations
from the baseline are observed in the quantity of retrofits as well as in the share of energy
classes and carriers in the total final building stock (Table 5, Figures 5, 6 and 7).
6.2.4 Places 2 and 1: Performance requirements
In the initial form of the scenario with energy performance requirements for new buildings,
energy conservation (total final energy consumption in 2060: -2.06%) is below the savings of
the remediation duty and the carbon tax scenarios (Table 4 and Figure 3). The scenario’s emis-
sion mitigation (total CO2 emissions in 2060: -10.04%) are however well above those of the
two previous scenarios, so that the mean value of energy and emissions savings becomes the
second-highest among all 10 single-instrument scenarios (Table 4 and Figure 4). In this case,
energy conservation is achieved through the joint decrease of the 2060 conventional energy
consumption (-0.86%) and the adjustment factor (-2.03%) (cf. 6.2.1) (Table 5). The regulation
implies that only 3 performance classes are allowed for new buildings (A, ZEB and PEB); a
large majority goes for energy efficiency class A: 62.7% of the buildings in the total stock of
2060 have class A, compared to 3% with class ZEB or PEB (Table 6). In comparison with the
baseline there is also a trend for more solar thermal energy (34.2% of the total final building
stock) (Table 6).
By far the best environmental-effectiveness is however reached in the extended form of
this policy tool: not only does the instrument realise major energy savings (final energy con-
sumption in 2060: -32.87%), but it also achieves massive carbon dioxide reductions (total CO2
emissions in 2060: -48.62%) (Table 4, Figures 3 and 4). These major savings particularly stem
from a much more efficient NBS which induces the largest decrease of the total conventional
energy consumption in 2060 (-27.53%; Table 5). The share of dwellings in the total final stock
with an energy efficiency class above B is equal in the initial and extended forms of the building
code, but a clearly higher share of ZEB (12.6%) and PEB (26.7%) exists in the latter form (Table
6, Figures 5 and 6). Note that although the NBS increases continuously, the greater construction
of PEB (as of 2030) results in a strong decrease of the NBS’ final energy consumption (Figure 8),
induced by the new buildings’ energy production. Remarkable is also that in 2060 more than
half of the total building stock uses solar thermal energy to support their heating system (Table
6 and Figure 6). These large performance improvements are followed by a comparably large
rebound effect: with a raise of 3.60% in 2060, the highest increase of the adjustment factor is
observed in this scenario (Table 5 and Figure 2). Moreover, no direct state revenues or expenses
are generated by the policy tool (Table 7).
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While none of the single-instrument scenarios achieves the country’s energy and climate
objectives in time, the extended form of the energy performance requirements for new build-
ings is the only tool that accomplishes the 2020 energy targets as well as the 2030 emission goals
(not in time, but) in the course of the projection period (Table 8). The latter goal (-40% of total
CO2 emissions compared to 2005) is fulfilled in 2050, and the energy target (-20% of total final
energy consumption compared to 2007) is realised in 2055.
6.3 Evaluation of combined energy policy tools
In the previous section we observed that the 10 single-policy instruments have different ecolog-
ical and financial impacts. To accumulate the advantages of these instruments, policy makers
normally combine the tools in packages and apply them simultaneously. In addition to the
standard evaluation of the scenarios’ effectiveness (see above), we now evaluate whether or
not instruments generate synergistic effects when applied concurrently. Therefore 3 multiple-
instrument scenarios are run: the first (second) consists of the currently applied instruments in
their initial (extended) form; the third corresponds to the second except that we consider the
initial form of the energy tax and include the two possible future instruments.
6.3.1 Bundle 1
From an environmental viewpoint, running the model with the policy mix that is currently
applied by the Luxembourgish state results in a decrease of the total final energy consumption
(-2.45% in 2060) and CO2 emissions (-10.53% in 2060) that is almost identical to the cumulated
decrease of the corresponding single-instrument scenarios (Table 4, Figures 3 and 4). In this
first instrument package, the effects of capital grants, subsidised loans, and the energy tax are
insignificant, so that the observed savings mainly stem from the performance requirements.
Many outcomes of the multiple-instrument scenario are hence similar to those of the building
code scenario: energy conservation comes (in the bundle, just as in the code) from an interplay
of better energy efficiency (total conventional energy consumption in 2060: -1.05%; Table 5) and
energy sufficiency (adjustment factor in 2060: -2.14%; Table 5 and Figure 2); the share of energy
classes and carriers in the total final building stock is also nearly identical (in the bundle and
in the code) (Table 6, Figures 5 and 6).
From a financial viewpoint, we are interested in the (negative) balance of state revenues
minus state expenses. The absolute value of this balance is greater than the cumulated balances
of the individual policy tools. The state revenues of the policy package are below those of the
energy tax scenario (due to a lower energy consumption) and the state expenses are greater
than the cumulated expenses of the capital grant and subsidised loan scenario (due to a higher
share of eligible dwellings). With a benefit to cost ratio of 5 € per kWh (Table 7) the scenario’s
higher energy savings lead to a significantly better economic effectiveness.
Moreover, the 2020 emission target is realised during the projection period (in 2047) (Table 8).
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6.3.2 Bundle 2
Further improvements in environmental and economic effectiveness are achieved in the second
policy package scenario: compared to the 2060 baseline levels energy savings of 34.60% and
carbon dioxide reductions of 50.71% (Table 4, Figures 3 and 4) are realised.
Environmentally, similar to Bundle 1, the savings of Bundle 2 are almost identical to the
cumulated decreases of the corresponding single-instrument scenarios (Table 4, Figures 3 and
4). The presence of capital grants, subsidised loans and the energy tax in the package leads
to a greater energy efficiency than in the extended building code scenario (total conventional
energy consumption in 2060: -28.13%; Table 5) and to a lower rebound effect (adjustment factor
in 2060: +2.90%; Table 5 and Figure 2).
Compared to Bundle 1, the balance of state revenues and expenses more than quadruples.
Due to the much larger energy savings in Bundle 2, the scenario yet generates a benefit to cost
ratio of 2 € per kWh saved (Table 7), which means that the economic effectiveness is further
increased.
In Bundle 2, even though the energy and emission targets are not achieved in time, they
are all achieved within the projection period (Table 8). The 2020 energy objective is realised in
2054, and the 2020 (2030) emission goal in 2037 (2044).
6.3.3 Bundle 3
The highest and most cost-effective energy and emission savings are realised in the multiple-
instrument scenario of Bundle 3: for state expenses of less than 1 € per kWh saved (Table 7), the
2060 final energy consumption decreases by 42.37% and the CO2 emissions by 59.53% (Table 4,
Figures 3 and 4).
Despite the very large performance improvement of the total building stock (total conven-
tional energy consumption in 2060: -36.32%; Table 5), the scenario projects a relatively low
rebound effect (adjustment factor in 2060: +2.40%; Table 5 and Figure 2). This is mostly due
to the carbon tax, an instrument that realises most of its savings through a better energy suf-
ficiency. Moreover, the higher quantity of cumulated annual retrofits in 2060 (about +39%;
Table 5 and Figure 7) is due to the incorporation of the remediation duty. This instrument, to-
gether with the performance requirements for new constructions, is primarily responsible for
the share of efficient energy classes and carriers in the total building stock of 2060, which is the
highest among all 10 scenarios (Table 6, Figures 5 and 6).
Similarly to Bundle 2, all national energy and emission targets are reached belatedly (Table
8): while a decrease of the final energy consumption by 20% is reached in 2048, emissions
mitigation of 20% (30%) are realised in 2034 (2040).
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7 Conclusion
With a focus on the Grand Duchy of Luxembourg, the present paper evaluates the influence
of energy policy tools on final energy consumption and direct CO2 emissions in the residential
building sector. For this purpose, we use the advanced version LuxHEI of the French hybrid
energy-economy model Res-IRF (Giraudet et al., 2012), which we also customised to the truly
specific characteristics of Luxembourg. The LuxHEI model is an energy policy model that is
based on economic principles and takes into account global warming, the green value, sustain-
able energy efficiency classes and energy carriers, a limited availability of carriers... Based
on our model’s results, four principal conclusions can be drawn. Firstly, we observe that
building codes generate the largest energy conservation and mitigation of carbon dioxide emis-
sions, without requiring direct government spending. Secondly, environmental effectiveness is
achieved differently depending on the instrument type: while subsidy schemes and regulations
mainly affect the building stock’s energy efficiency, taxes usually induce a more conscious heat-
ing behaviour. Thirdly, when used simultaneously, policy tools neither counteract nor generate
direct synergistic effects, but their individual impacts are more or less added-up. Therefore, the
policy package with the greatest number of instruments (Bundle 3) also generates the largest
effects. Fourthly, in none of the evaluated policy scenarios the national energy and emission
targets are achieved on time.
Although we encoded quite a few new features (for example more sophisticated be-
havioural factors) to increase our dynamic simulation model’s level of realism, it remains a
stylised illustration of the real world. This means that modelling assumptions (for example
about households’ decision-making behaviour and the evolution of the new dwellings’ surface
or building type), but also parameterisation hypotheses (for example about climate change or
population growth) are still subject to uncertainty. Changing these suppositions might affect
the scenarios’ outcomes to a certain extent. As concerns the barriers to energy efficiency, not
all of them are fully representable in a model (especially those of behavioural nature) and the
LuxHEI model’s projections may therefore be somewhat optimistic. Further, we did not directly
encode the impact of communicative policy tools, which tend to nudge households to behave
in a more environmentally conscious way. Even if the energy saving potential of such instru-
ments is relatively small (Gillingham et al., 2018), their absence in the model may induce a bit
too pessimistic results, thus counteracting the preceding limitation. We are thus confident that
the model’s predictions are fairly accurate.
The policy recommendations that accompany our analysis are in compliance with other
studies (Schaefer et al., 2000; Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007; Weiss et al., 2012). More pre-
cisely, in the case of Luxembourg, these policy advices can be phrased as follows. Because all
instruments have their pros and cons, and induce higher overall effectiveness when applied
concurrently, a suitable combination of energy policy tools is advisable for the Luxembourgish
residential building sector. In this policy mix, regulatory instruments should play a central
role as they have the potential to strongly decrease the sector’s energy consumption and CO2
emissions at low governmental costs. Even though such standards are easier to enforce for new
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buildings (Köppel and Ürge-Vorsatz, 2007), efforts should persist to ensure the implementation
of the remediation duty for existing buildings. Moreover, our simulations confirm that regula-
tions don’t encourage households to go beyond the standard’s requirements; the threshold of
these two regulatory instruments should thus be raised regularly. With the two latter instru-
ments being included into the national policy mix, the further presence of capital grants and
subsidised loans is essential. These financial instruments allow low-income homes to meet the
standard’s demands and incite households to go beyond the threshold. However, our results
indicate that the design of these subsidy schemes is decisive for the tool’s cost-effectiveness:
the instrument’s application period should be limited relative to the product’s market dynam-
ics and eligible households should be specified. To curb the rebound effect that is induced by
these four instruments, taxes should not be omitted in the country’s policy mix. Considering
the overall effectiveness of evaluated tax instruments, we advise the government to focus on
the implementation of a national carbon tax (and hereby set an important example for other
EU Member States), and to maintain the energy tax rates at the required minimum level of the
ETD. To reduce the adverse effects of such a taxation policy, that is falling economic growth or
competitiveness of heavy energy-using industries, the revenues of the tax should be used to
promote energy conservation (Callan et al., 2009) (for example by using the revenues to fund a
part of the subsidy schemes).
We finish with a few ideas for a follow-up project. In an alternative modelling method
one could consider the dwellings’ thermal insulation class instead of their energy efficiency class,
and add into the model information about their heating system. That way, the determination
of the building stock’s final space heating energy demand could be improved, and dwellings
that realise energy savings by solely replacing their heating system could be taken into ac-
count. Moreover, a better representation of households’ behavioural patterns, for example the
decision-making behaviour and the adjustment factor, could be achieved by including addi-
tional socio-economic variables into the model. Such modifications should be realised once the
needed data on Luxembourgish households are available.
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A Appendix
Table 4 – Final energy consumption and direct CO2 emissions (total building stock)
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Table 5 – Number of retrofits ; Conventional energy consumption and Adjustment factor (total
building stock)
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Table 6 – Share of dwellings per energy class and carrier (total building stock of 2060)
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Table 7 – Benefit to cost ratio (in € ; from a governmental perspective)
Baseline 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Individual energy policy tools
1. Applied instruments - initial form
Capital grants 0.00 506140246.29 -506140246.29 -74.10
Subsidised loans 0.00 38398742.03 -38398742.03 -100.51
Energy tax 199761810.82 0.00 199761810.82 14.33
Energy performance requirements 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
2. Applied instruments - extended form
Capital grants 0.00 1871412395.10 -1871412395.10 -123.79
Subsidised loans 0.00 123503822.62 -123503822.62 -135.61
Energy tax 531075380.17 0.00 531075380.17 8.02
Energy performance requirements 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
3. Possible future instruments
Remediation duty 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
Carbon tax 2251340323.00 0.00 2251340323.00 10.15
Combined energy policy tools
Bundle 1 189813712.28 734329463.99 -544515751.71 -5.40
Bundle 2 451734598.71 2745141617.20 -2293407018.49 -1.61
Bundle 3 1776900472.89 2926571465.93 -1149670993.04 -0.66
Scenario
Direct revenues Direct expenses Benefit to cost ratio 
(€/kWh saved)
during instrument's time period
Balance
Table 8 – Energy consumption (comp. to 2007) ; CO2 emissions (comp. to 2005)
2020 2020 2030
Target : -20% Target: -20% Target: -40%
Baseline 28.79% 18.97% 6.55% 6.76% -4.44% -21.10%
Individual energy policy tools
1. Applied instruments - initial form
Capital grants 28.68% 18.81% 6.37% 6.46% -4.80% -21.47%
Subsidised loans 28.79% 18.96% 6.54% 6.76% -4.45% -21.11%
Energy tax 27.80% 18.33% 6.19% 5.96% -4.96% -21.39%
Energy performance requirements 28.37% 18.39% 4.35% 4.63% -7.94% -29.02%
2. Applied instruments - extended form
Capital grants 28.66% 18.75% 6.16% 6.44% -5.05% -21.93%
Subsidised loans 28.79% 18.96% 6.53% 6.76% -4.45% -21.12%
Energy tax 27.80% 17.71% 4.84% 5.96% -5.46% -22.49%
Energy performance requirements 28.37% 17.41% -28.47% 4.63% -8.44% -59.46%
3. Possible future instruments
Remediation duty 28.79% 17.63% 1.67% 6.76% -5.68% -25.26%
Carbon tax 28.79% 14.56% 0.82% 6.76% -8.06% -25.86%
Combined energy policy tools
Bundle 1 27.37% 17.68% 3.94% 3.75% -8.58% -29.41%
Bundle 2 27.35% 16.09% -30.32% 3.73% -9.66% -61.11%
Bundle 3 27.35% 11.07% -38.60% 3.73% -13.92% -68.07%
Scenario
Final energy consumption compared to 2007 Direct CO2 emissions compared to 2005
2030 2060 2060
40
Figure 1 – Evolution of the existing and new building stock
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Figure 2 – Adjustment factor (total building stock)
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Figure 3 – Final energy consumption (kWh) (total building stock)
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Figure 4 – Direct CO2 emissions (t CO2) (total building stock)
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Figure 5 – Number of dwellings per energy class (total building stock of 2060)
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Figure 6 – Number of dwellings per energy carrier (total building stock of 2060)
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Figure 7 – Number of retrofitted dwellings
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Figure 8 – Final energy consumption (kWh) (new building stock)
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